On Secondary Thought: What Corporations Should Consider When Exploring the Secondary Market
How SecondWave offers an alternative to corporations looking to sell their venture portfolios
For corporations that have lost interest in their startup investments, the market has made it easy to leave.
Total secondary volume hit a record $220 billion in 2025, up 42% from the year before, and the major buyers William Blair surveyed expect $250 billion this year.
Source: William Blair, 2026 Secondary Market Report (Exhibit 1). 2026 is a survey forecast.
Selling is a real option, and for some portfolios it may be the right call. But before you run that process, it helps to know what a sale gets you and what it costs, along with the alternatives available to corporations that no longer want to manage their venture investments.
The vintage taxCorporate sellers usually start from the value on their books. The market rarely agrees, and it agrees least on venture. What a buyer will pay depends above all on when a company last raised money.
PitchBook’s analysis of trades on Forge Global, a marketplace and data provider for private company shares, found that the discount tracks the calendar: a median 59% discount for companies that last raised in 2021, 20% for 2024, and nothing at all for 2026.
Source: PitchBook, Q2 2026 US VC Valuations Report, citing Forge completed trades as of June 30, 2026.
Call it the vintage tax. A 2021 round is the last price anyone has seen for that company. Without a newer one, a buyer can’t tell a company that grew into its valuation from one that didn’t.
This isn’t only a corporate problem. By PitchBook’s count , 574 US venture firms that had raised a fund in the prior six years had made no known investment since late 2023, up about 50% from the end of 2021. Carta found that only 30% of 2020-vintage venture funds had returned any cash to their investors by early 2025.
Corporate sellers pay more of the vintage tax than anyone. They usually sell positions in individual companies rather than fund stakes, and the programs that went quiet in 2022 and 2023 hold exactly the vintages the market punishes hardest.
Sources: Jefferies, July 2026 (fund stakes); VO2 Partners via GCV, November 2024 (corporate sales); PitchBook Q2 2026 US VC Valuations Report, citing Forge (company shares). Measured against different reference values; dates differ.
PayPal is a recent example of a firm that found the secondary market unwilling to match its desired price. This year, the company paused new investments at PayPal Ventures, which had backed more than 80 companies since 2016. PayPal reportedly hired Jefferies to explore selling some of its holdings on the secondary market, and by September, Axios reported that PayPal had paused plans to sell its venture portfolio after bids came in lower than expected.
What’s fixable, and what isn’tNot every dollar of that discount is the market being wrong. Some 2021 rounds were priced at multiples that will never return. But the discount on a stale position stacks three costs together, and only one of them is permanent.
- Legacy impairment. The part of the old mark that was simply too high. No one can undo it, and an honest manager says so.
- Impairment from neglect. Value lost after the program goes quiet: a missed pro-rata, a pay-to-play round that converts preferred shares to common, a consent deadline nobody answered. This is preventable.
- The information discount. What a buyer subtracts because it has no current data. This is recoverable.
Even a fresh 2025 round trades about 5% below its price, which is the cost of liquidity anyone pays. If just one-third of the remaining gap is missing information, about $8 million is recoverable before a sale.
The clock also resets. When a portfolio company raises a new priced round, the discount on its shares falls toward recent-round levels, and GCV notes that a secondary sale is far easier to arrange while the startup is raising. An owner who is paying attention can time a sale to that window.
What the startup hearsBeyond the sale price, there’s a cost that never reaches a spreadsheet. When a corporate investor sells, the founder doesn’t see a balance-sheet cleanup. They see a strategic backer deciding the company is not worth holding. If the corporate holds a board or observer seat, that decision plays out in front of the company’s other directors.
At TechNexus, we’ve worked with a dozen corporations to make more than 280 venture investments over the last decade. We’ve also talked to dozens of corporates that silently wound down their venture programs, ghosting the founders they once championed. Co-investors notice, and the next round gets harder.
Venture has a long memory, too. A corporate that walked away is rarely the first call when the next strong deal comes together, and if it ever restarts its program, it starts from behind.
Corporate sellers know this. Laurence Levi of VO2 Partners told GCV in late 2024 that roughly a quarter of the corporates he works with choose structured deals specifically to avoid being seen retreating from their programs. The most common is a strip sale , in which the corporate sells a fixed slice of every position to one buyer and keeps the rest, staying on every cap table in exchange for a smaller check. Corporates are already paying real money to avoid the signal.
The option you give up is real, too. In GCV’s Keystone benchmarking survey , 40% of corporate venture units said their parent had acquired at least one portfolio company. No one sells a company they plan to buy. But a portfolio sold in one block, by a team that hasn’t looked at it in two years, can include the one the business that might have value to the corporate. You can’t know which positions carry that option until someone reviews them.
The case for SecondWaveWe are not against secondaries. We’re against selling blind. Whether a corporate sells, rebuilds internally or hands off the work, the first step is the same. Recover the information discount, then decide.
SecondWave, part of TechNexus Venture Collaborative, is professional management of a corporate venture portfolio you continue to own. We are not a buyer, we don’t take your assets at a discount, and we don’t ask you to restart a fund. You keep the positions.and every decision that matters: what to hold, what to sell, how to vote on board matters and when to exit.
What you hand off is the management burden. We become the point of contact for portfolio companies, handle consent notices, cap tables and valuation reporting, and bring dilutive or pay-to-play rounds to your committee before the deadline. Our PRIME/X rubric scores each company so you know the true value of your positions.
What you keep is your seat at the table. The startup still sees an engaged investor on its cap table, and co-investors see a corporate that manages its commitments instead of exiting them. That matters the next time you want to invest, partner or acquire.
Our 90-day Portfolio Diagnostic Assessment builds the data room, sets an independent fair market value, scores every position and delivers a recommendation ready for your investment committee.
Before joining TechNexus to launch SecondWave, I was a general partner of a Fortune 500 corporate venture fund. I have watched corporates skip the hard look at their options and then pay for it with founders, co-investors and their own reputation. SecondWave exists so they don't have to.
Does your portfolio need a new owner, or does it need someone to run it?
Steve Sanger is a Venture Partner at TechNexus Venture Collaborative and part of the founding team behind SecondWave, TechNexus’s professional portfolio management service for corporations.
By Steve Sanger at TechNexus Venture Collaborative